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Abstract: In this paper I argue that, though many ethical systems recognize 
sacrifice as moral action, the utilitarian appropriation of Neo-Darwinian 
theory especially as it justifies eugenics as a “winnowing of the human stock” 
is in Girardian terms analogous to the sacrificial scapegoating of innocents. 
This argument is accomplished in four steps. (1) I show that within some 
ethical systems sacrifice is recognized as moral behavior driven by a specific 
axiology (or theory of value) (2) I discuss some of the meta-ethical problems 
connected with Neo-Darwinian naturalism and naturalism, in general.  (3) I 
show how modern varieties of naturalism and Darwinian naturalism, in 
particular are especially inclined to lead to a moral justification of eugenic 
scapegoating and how Girardian theory is helpful in identifying the moral 
disorder connected with eugenics. (4) Finally, I conclude by arguing that 
Darwin’s thought is susceptible to another kind of interpretation, one that 
need not lead to the valorization of eugenics.  
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INTRODUCTION  
In the early 21
st century, some philosophers and biologists have begun 
to reassess the relevance of Neo-Darwinian thought for ethics in a way 
that mimics their 19
th century ancestors. What they have proposed is a 
new naturalist ethics based upon competition and natural selection. 
The pedigree for the philosophical assumptions that are foundational 
for this kind of ethical thinking stretches back at least as far as John 
Hobbes and forms a line of descent including David Hume, Adam 
Smith, Thomas Malthus and Charles Darwin.  Earlier theoreticians and 
ideologues of both left and right and as diverse as Karl Marx, Fredrick 
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Engels, H. G. Wells and Adolf Hitler all advocated programs of 
eugenics and justified them according to a utilitarian interpretation of 
Darwinian theory.  In similar fashion, left and right wing thinkers in 
the 20
th and early 21
st century thinkers such as Robert Nozick, Peter 
Singer, Lee Silver, et al. and have begun to re-appropriate Darwinian 
theory as a justification for eugenics (Singer 2000a, 2000b, Singer & 
Wells 1985; Nozick 2001, 1974).  
 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS ESSAY  
It is my purpose in this paper to argue that though many ethical 
systems recognize sacrifice as moral action, the utilitarian 
appropriation of Darwinian theory especially as it justifies eugenics as 
a “winnowing of the human stock” is analogous to the sacrificial 
scapegoating of innocents.  I hope to accomplish this argument in the 
following steps. After showing that within some ethical systems 
sacrifice is recognized as moral behavior driven by a specific axiology 
(or theory of value), I will discuss some of the meta-ethical problems 
connected with Neo-Darwinian naturalism and naturalism, in general.  
Next, I will show how modern varieties of naturalism and Darwinian 
naturalism, in particular are especially inclined to lead to a moral 
justification of eugenic scapegoating and how Girardian theory is 
helpful in identifying the moral disorder connected with eugenics. 
Finally, I will conclude by arguing that Darwin’s thought is susceptible 
to another kind of interpretation, one that need not lead to the 
valorization of eugenics.  In other words, I will conclude by arguing 
that Darwinian evolutionary theory may be read in ways that do not 
lead to sacrificial scapegoating.  
 
SACRIFICE AS MORAL ACTION  
According to its common meaning, and according to the broadest 
meaning of the word, sacrifice is the giving up or offering up of 
something or someone for some purpose or end.  In most ethical 
systems, sacrifice has been valorized, especially inasmuch as it has 
been connected with the growth of virtue.  In Stoic ethics, for example, 
the sacrifice of goods or pleasure is productive of the highest virtue of 
apatheia or detachment from pleasure; in Christian ethics is connected 
with selflessness and directly counteracts the effects of jealousy, envy, 
and covetousness.  For Christians, sacrifice is preeminently a mark of 
an understanding of charity whose dual referents are God and 
neighbor.  Sacrifice, thus construed as a variety of moral action, is 46      AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences                         
 
ethically unproblematic, especially when the “sacrificial victim” offers 
him/herself with free volition, intending a positive aretological effect 
and/or external effect and as long as the nature of the sacrifice is not 
pathologically destructive of his/her physical being.  
When, however, the victim is unwilling to be sacrificed and/or 
coerced by another and the expectation is that s/he will be forced to 
endure a sacrifice that is destructive of his/her physical existence, or 
when the victim is pathologically bent upon his/her physical 
immolation, then sacrifice is generally viewed as morally problematic.  
In either case, sacrifice is a kind of action to which value may 
be connected. It constitutes a kind of action whose morality or 
immorality may be judged. As a kind of moral action, it can be 
evaluated according to the general criteria that characterize ethical 
systems under which it nests.  
 
THE FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF ETHICAL SYSTEMS AS 
APPLYING TO SACRIFICE  
Ethical systems can be analyzed on the basis of five questions: (1) 
What is Goodness for the system? (2) What is the purpose of moral 
action in the system? (3) Is the goodness or evil of an action intrinsic 
or extrinsic (or both) according to the system? (4) Is the intentionality 
of action relevant to its determination as good or evil in the system? (5) 
Are the consequences of action relevant to its determination as good or 
evil?  All five features are relevant to the question “How is moral 
action good?”  
With a little reframing of these features, it is possible to 
analyze sacrifice, accordingly. Since sacrifice is a kind of moral action, 
whatever applies to the whole class of moral actions should apply to 
sacrifice. Thus reframed, four of these features become queries about 
the moral nature of sacrifice. These are: (1’) What is the moral purpose 
of sacrifice? (2’) Is the goodness of sacrifice intrinsic or extrinsic? (3’) 
Is the intention of the sacrificial act relevant to its determination as 
good or evil? (4’) Are the consequences of sacrifice relevant to its 
determination as good or evil? The first feature of ethical systems the 
way they characterize the nature of the good has great relevance to the 
evaluation of sacrifice. Especially as it is fundamental to the kind of 
ethical system in which sacrifice finds itself, it establishes the 
definitive meaning of the nouns “the Good” or “goodness” and the 
adjective “good” as these are related to sacrificial action.  AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences      47 
 
Thus, for each ethical system in which it is possible to 
characterize sacrifice according to these five features, there are various 
ways in which sacrifice is evaluated according to the purpose of moral 
action and there are a variety of theoretical strategies by which it is 
possible to characterize sacrifice as good or as evil. Typically, four 
broad approaches can be counted answering to the purpose of moral 
action: hedonistic, utilitarian, deontological and aretological 
approaches. With some plausibility, it is possible to argue I think that 
according to purpose, two of the three ethical systems (the hedonistic 
and the aretological) are (for the most part) reducible to the utilitarian 
approach so long as the specifics of their axiologies or theories of 
value are kept distinct. In other words, there is a utilitarian aspect to 
three of the possible forms of ethics, the only exception being 
deontology. In the case of hedonism, the good is that which is useful 
for obtaining pleasure, pleasure being the ultimate good; for aretology, 
the good is that which is useful for obtaining virtue and perfecting 
human nature, virtue being the precondition to union with God, union 
with God being the ultimate good; and for utilitarianism proper, good 
instrumentalities are whatever enables one to achieve any final or 
proximate good variously defined as profitability, the greatest good for 
the greatest number, etc.  
In contrast, deontology makes moral action sui generis.  
Categorically unique, it is to be done because it is rationally, intuitively 
and/or religiously compelling. Since the time of Kant, deontological 
ethics have been classified according to whether they are compelled 
based on heteronomous qualities and/or authorities, whether they are 
based on autonomous qualities and/or authorities, or whether they are 
based on a combination of both autonomous and heteronomous 
qualities and/or authorities. Relevant to the purpose of moral action 
there are two broad divisions of ethics, that of deontology and that of 
utility (both divisions being construed in the broadest possible sense).  
On the other hand, the purpose that characterizes each of these 
ethical varieties can take a series of possible theories of value. These 
strategies are sometimes referred to as theories of Goodness, or 
theories of the Good, or axiologies (or theories of value). For the 
purpose of this presentation I will use the less familiar neologism 
‘agathology’ (from ‘agathon’ Greek for the good) to describe. Here, 
the broadest categories of axiology or agathology are two: naturalist 
and non-naturalist. The naturalist approach to value or the Good is one 
that says that what is provides the best guide to what ought to be done, 48      AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences                         
 
while the non-naturalist approach proceeds from the assumption that 
what is cannot be a guide to what ought to be. It is possible to relate 
the taxonomy of ethical purposes together with the taxonomy of 
axiologies to make the following generalization: Historically, non-
naturalist ethics tend to be a priori, deontological and intuitionist while 
naturalist ethics tend to be a posteriori, utilitarian, and cognitivist.  
When eugenics has been proposed as a means by which to 
improve or perfect the human stock, it has most often been proposed as 
such within an ethical frame that was naturalist. However, naturalist 
ethics come in many flavors and, because of this, is a highly contested 
concept. Although it would be true to say that almost all programs of 
eugenics have been proposed within some variety of ethical naturalism 
it would be mistaken to reverse the implication and suggest that 
naturalism generally entails such programs.  
 
META-ETHICAL CRITICISMS OF ETHICAL NATURALISM AND 
CONTRARY ARGUMENTS  
The earliest critic of naturalist ethics was David Hume, who in his 
Treatise on Human Nature, suggested that to argue from facts to 
values was an invalid form of reasoning, although it did not retrain his 
followers from employing this very form of reasoning when they 
discovered facts that they believed made this admissible.
1 In  John 
                                                           
1  Two hypotheses about the relation between nature and the ought have been 
proposed in classical ethical theory. The deontological principle suggests that the 
relationship between a command and nature is that between the ought and the can. In 
logical terms “One ought to do something implies that one can do that thing and that 
thing is valued” or (x,y) [O(x,y)  [ D(x,y)   V(y, +)]]. This suggests that all 
commands are dependent upon possibility as a natural feature of one’s situation, or as 
a feature of human nature, or as an expansion of human nature supplemented by 
grace. Conversely, if something cannot be done, then it cannot be commanded 
[[D(x,y)   V(y, +)]   O(x,y)] or if it is not positively valued it cannot be 
commanded [[D(x,y)  V(y, +)]  O(x,y)].  
A second principle is sometimes called the naturalistic principle attempts to 
derive the command from what is. It says, in effect, that what ought to be done is best 
modeled on what is done or on the nature of things. Here, the attempt is to derive the 
ought from what is.  Here the order between the two terms is reversed, thus D(x,y) 
and y has some positive value then O(x,y), y ought to be done, in other words 
D(x,y)  V(y, +)  O(x,y). Coupling the logical descriptions of the first principle 
and second principles together, it is possible to reformulate the naturalist assertion as 
[O(x,y)  [D(x,y)  V(y, +)]]. Here, the notion of a positive value is determinative 
of the logic of the command but it leaves unclear whether valuation is based on 
objective properties of the thing or whether it is rooted in human subjectivity. Also, AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences      49 
 
Searle’s more incisive formulation, Hume’s proscription means four 
things: (1) “there is a class of statements of fact which is logically 
distinct from statements of value”; (2) no set of statements of fact by 
themselves entails any statement of value”; (3) therefore, “no set of 
descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement without the 
addition of at least one evaluative premise”; and (4) “to believe 
otherwise is to commit what has been called the naturalist fallacy.” 
(Searle 1964/1967, 101)  
Against Hume’s argument, John Searle has been able to show 
that the derivation of an evaluative statement from statements of fact is 
indeed possible via a second set of descriptive statements different 
from descriptions of brute fact, a set of statements that applies to 
institutions that constitute them. (Searle 1964/1967, 111)  Institutional 
facts are governed by constitutional rules without which they would be 
impossible; constitutional rules establish the very institution that they 
regulate because “constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) 
forms of activity whose existence is logically dependent on the rules.” 
(Searle 1964/1967, 112) As an example of such rules an example 
which also functions as a tautological description Searle produces the 
following example: “All promises are (create, are understandings of, 
are acceptances of) obligations and one ought to keep (fulfill) one’s 
obligations.” (Searle 1964/1967, 108) Constitutive rules are those that 
make the social reality possible and define it as the kind of thing it is.  
Here, Searle seems to understand constitutional rules as applying only 
within invented social structures, but there would not seem to be a 
good reason to thus confine them. It should be possible to define a 
class of such rules which are also metaphysically constitutive, a set of 
                                                                                                                                          
excluded is the question of whether what ought to be done is defined in conformity 
with one’s own nature, also excluding what that nature might possibly become. This 
latter oversight introduces a question as to what one’s nature is which tantamount to 
a metaphysical question. The question becomes irrelevant if one believes—as some 
maintain—that human nature is pure potentiality. Pure potentiality undermines the 
naturalist approach because there is no conceivable way to use the past to evaluate 
the future. Pure plasticity provides no better reason to do something than to avoid it. 
Finally, it is clear that whatever naturalism is, it cannot be based on an evaluation 
that suggests everything that human nature currently is provides the basis for action. 
Obviously, human nature must possess some imperfections and these cannot 
command a course of action consistent with them, which would also be moral.  
If, however, one assumes that human nature is relatively stable though not 
perfect, then one can reformulate the naturalistic principle as [(HNx  D(x,y))  
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such rules based in description of what it means to be human but 
obliging performance as constitutive of that very humanity. I would 
argue that this is precisely how moral theology or religious ethics 
functions in many faith traditions. Within the Roman Catholic tradition 
moral precepts, obeyed, form the reality (humanity) that they describe 
and to which they are related; in the Jewish tradition commandments 
and covenant function in much the same way.  
In his Principia Ethica (1903), G. E. Moore mounted a two-
front attack upon empiricist and metaphysical naturalistic ethics by 
strengthening the Humean thesis. Moore’s attack on empiricist 
naturalism was specifically directed against social Darwinism (though 
it also undermined the morality of the implicit Eugenics) that had 
exercised significant influence in the latter quarter of the 19
th century. 
It was also directed against what he terms “metaphysical ethics” which 
is also subject to the naturalist fallacy without empiricist pretensions. 
For Moore, the empiricist version of the naturalist fallacy (in its 
simplest form) implies that when we think ‘This is good,’ what we are 
thinking is that the thing in question bears a definite relation to some 
one other thing [the Good].  But this one thing, by which the good is 
defined, may be either what I may call a natural object something of 
which the existence is admittedly an object of experience or else it may 
be an object which is only inferred to exist in a supersensible world. 
(Moore 1903/1988, 25.38-39)  
Although the logical form of Moore’s argument has been much 
disputed, it is clear that he argues two things against all varieties of 
naturalism: (1) that the possibility of deriving a value statement from a 
factual statement is impossible (as per the strong interpretation of the 
Humean thesis mentioned above) and (2) that the good is simple, 
single, irreducible and indefinable.
2  
                                                           
2 Louis Pojman (EDRW, 141-142) attempts to provide the logical form for Moore’s 
general argument, but casts it as an example of an erotetic argument without 
sufficient explanation.  However, Pojman’s argument can be cast in standard logical 
form as follows: 
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Logical argument: 
 
(1)  A complete definition of 
goodness is one that can be 
made  wholly in terms of 
another property.  
  
(2)  A synthetic definition 
(empirically) adds information 
to the notion to be defined. 
 
(3)  x is Good = df  x is A  NP(A) 
 
(4)  #3 is an example of #2. 
 
(5)  x is Good  [x is A  NP(A)] 
 
(6)  ~[x is A  NP(A)]  ~[x is 
Good] 
 
(7)  x is Good  x is Good 
 
(8)  x is Good  [x is A  NP(A)]  
 
(9)  #5    #8 
 
(10)   [#2   #5]   ~[#1  #7]  
[#1  #7]  ~[#2  #5] 
 
(11)  #1  #7 
  
(12)   ~[#2  #5] 
 
 
Interpretation: 
 
(1)  A complete definition of 
goodness is one that can be made 
wholly in terms of another 
property. (Common assumption 
of Moore and the naturalists.) 
(2)  A synthetic definition 
(empirically) adds information to 
the notion to be defined. 
(3)  The definition of the Good is a 
synthetic definition asserting that 
x is the Good when x is A 
(adapted) and the property A 
(adaptability) is NP (a natural 
property). 
(4)  Formula #3 is a synthetic 
definition. 
(5)  If x is Good then x is A (adapted) 
and to be A (adaptability) means 
to be a natural predicate. [From 
the notion of synthetic definition.] 
(6)  X is A (adapted) and to be A 
(adapted) is a natural predicate is 
a necessary condition for x’s 
being Good [but not a sufficient 
condition].  
(7)  X is Good if and only if x is 
Good. [#1 by instantiation, 
identity; tautology] 
(8)  X is Good if and only if x is A 
(adapted) and A is a natural 
property.  
(9)  Lines #5 and # 8 contradict one 
another. 
(10) Therefore, either #2 is true and # 
1 & #7 are not or #1 & #7 is true 
and #2 is not. 
(11) But #1 and #7 
(12) Therefore, not #2 and #5. 
 
 
The above argument is decisive only for the Spenserian social Darwinist 
interpretation of naturalist ethics because this ethics is inconsistent in its reduction of 
the Good to adaptability.  Because Moore has not provided a general argument 
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The problem with empirical or metaphysical theories of the 
good, according to Moore, is that they define the good, multiply its 
genera or parts, reduce it to something that it manifestly is not and/or 
derive assertions about it from factual statements. Against naturalism 
Moore sets himself as anti-naturalist and intuitionist.  
Foundational to Moore’s critique of social Darwinism is his 
specification of the ethical variety under which it is best classified: 
“Those theories of Ethics … are [empirically] ‘naturalistic’ which 
declare the sole good to consist in some one property of things, which 
exists [has existed or will exist] in time; and which do so because they 
suppose that ‘good’ itself can be defined by reference to such a 
property.” (Moore 1903/1988, 27.41)  
Moore proceeds on the basis of this argument to refute social 
Darwinism of the Spenserian variety by showing at least six things: (1) 
that Spenser (and social Darwinians) transfer an inadmissible value to 
the strictly scientific category of the adapted (or more evolved) a 
transvaluation not allowed by Darwin’s scientific theory; (2) that this 
transvaluation introduces an implicit reference to a good end and the 
organism’s fulfillment of a purpose adapted to that end, an end which 
social Darwinists like Spenser merely allude to, without saying 
explicitly what it is; (3) that  Spenser equivocates between adaptability 
and pleasure as rival conceptions of ultimate value; (4) that pleasure is 
no more demonstrably connected with adaptability than is pain; (5) 
that Spenser is at a loss in demonstrating his thesis that there has been 
an empirically verifiable increase in net pleasure; (6) and that the 
evolutionary increase in pleasure is proof of adaptation and not 
devolution.  
Given the refutation of the Spenserian evolutionary ethics, 
Moore thinks a more general critique of evolutionary ethics is possible. 
Evolutionary ethics are to be generally rejected when they commands 
us “to move in the direction of evolution simply because it is the 
direction of evolution.” (Moore 1903/1988, 35.56) Unless we are 
prepared to say that the total set of all natural processes are good, we 
cannot valorize evolution because it is a part of the natural whole and 
if we take evolution as one process among others, then the only avenue 
to valorizing it against other processes means to already possess a 
criterion of the good. Finally, it is not at all clear that all the outcomes 
produced by evolution are in themselves good. Short of a Gumpian 
definition of evolution that says “goodness is as evolution does” AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences      53 
 
which, if accepted, brings us full circle a criterion independent of the 
evolutionary process is required to evaluate its outcomes.
3  
Moore’s critique of metaphysical ethics a set of systems he 
connects with the Stoics, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel is different from his 
critique of what he called “naturalist ethics” and what I term 
“empirical naturalist ethics,” anticipating a distinction I intend to make 
shortly. (Moore 1903/1988, 66.110) Metaphysical ethics do not 
suppose the Good to be reducible to some one property of the spatio-
temporal world, but hold that it is possible to “use some metaphysical 
proposition as a ground for inferring some fundamental proposition of 
Ethics” so that “ethical truths follow logically from metaphysical 
truths” and “Ethics should be based on Metaphysics.” (Ibid.) “[T]he 
result is that they all describe the Supreme Good in metaphysical 
terms.” (Ibid.) One should be clear that, here, Moore uses the word 
‘metaphysical’ in opposition to the word ‘natural’ and thus bifurcates 
the order of things in a way that naively follows materialist (and 
dualist) assumptions about what these each designate. (Moore 
1903/1988, 66.112) It would be equally acceptable, however, to 
formulate a naturalist ethics, not according to a preconceived dualism 
of the physical and the metaphysical that is between nature and 
supernature but according to a view which makes all existing beings 
natural, because they possesses natures or sets of characteristic features 
and powers. Thus, it would be possible to speak of a metaphysical, 
naturalist ethics. But this Moore, does not assume; his critique of 
metaphysical ethics turns in another direction.  
Moore’s critique of metaphysical ethics begins with an 
appreciation that metaphysical ethics, at least, recognizes that more 
than what is sensorially available in the spatio-temporal world is 
required for acquaintance with perfect goodness. (Moore 1903/1988, 
68.115) Moreover, he admits that a supersensible reality may have a 
direct bearing upon practical ethics, if that supersensible reality could 
                                                           
3 A “Gumpian” definition is one typified by the recursive, trite, though sometimes 
allusive, speech patterns of Winston Groom’s fictional creation, Forrest Gump. 
Forrest Gump is an especially useful example for illustrating the relationship between 
virtue and intelligence. In my moral theology classes, I enjoy arguing that Forrest 
Gump is a type of the Aristotelian virtuous actor, an actor in which goodness is not 
necessarily proportionate to genius. This—to my mind—is one of Aristotle’s most 
important realizations, one that has had important consequences for Christian ethics 
and spirituality. It is also one that is often forgotten by the “fallen angels” of the 
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explain the consequences our present life and moral behavior might 
have for the next. (Ibid.) On the other hand, he observes that most 
philosophical approaches to metaphysical ethics are not interested in 
this bearing. (They may even mock it.) And insofar as they maintain 
that the metaphysical Good is real and to be real means to have a 
nature of some sort, they are guilty of the naturalist fallacy. (Moore 
1903/1988, 67.113-114) By making the Good entirely metaphysical 
the one true reality they dissolve the ability to realize good, here and 
now and deny the intrinsic goodness of all things including human 
action in the physical world. (Moore 1903/1988, 68.116) To allow that 
there are intrinsically good things or actions in this world is to 
relinquish the unique metaphysical character of the Good and to 
multiply its kinds. (Moore 1903/1988, 68.116-117) This is something 
entailed by experience and human moral action but avoided by the 
purists among the advocates of metaphysical ethics. And, again, to 
resort to an explanation of the Good which makes it reducible to a 
metaphysical property is to make this procedure vulnerable to a 
refutation of the kind that Moore mounted against naturalist ethics 
because it is either to create a synthetic definition in which case it 
cannot be the necessary ground for an ethics or simply to assert a 
tautology of the form that the good is the good, virtue is virtue, etc. 
(Moore 1903/1988, 72.122-123).  
When metaphysical ethicists examine the proposition “This is 
good” they sometimes interpret this as equivalent to “This is willed in 
a certain way.” In claiming this, they subject themselves to a variation 
of the preceding argument. Either they recursively reintroduce the 
predicate good into a definition of the kind of willing it is or they 
create a synthetic definition which is insufficient and subject to his 
anti-naturalist refutation. Moreover, the object of an act of willing and 
the act of willing, itself, are two different things (Moore 1903/1988, 
85.141). And many things are called good without their being willed 
one way or another (Moore 1903/1988, 83.137). Even if it could be 
maintained that all good things were such by being-willed-in-a-certain-
way, there would arise the question whether their goodness was the 
cause of their being willed and if so then their being willed would not 
address what their goodness was but would demand a further 
explication which would differentiate them. Finally, if the 
metaphysical ethicist were to reduce the Good with what-is-willed-in-
a-certain-way, s/he would be, in effect, asserting that the question 
“What is the Good?” and the question “Why do we will x in a certain AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences      55 
 
way?” are the same question, which they are clearly not (Moore 
1903/1988, 84.138).  
Thus expressed, Moore’s critique stood as the strongest support 
for a non-naturalist ethics until P. T. Geach, in 1956, provided a 
refutation of one of its central tenets.  In his article, “Good and Evil,” 
Geach distinguished between the attributive and predicative meanings 
of adjectives in order to challenge Moore’s thesis that the Good must 
be simple and singular (Geach 1956/1967). Attributive adjectives are 
adjectives that signify qualities that are not separable from objects by 
splitting their predication, but are more directly relative to what the 
object is; whereas predicative adjectives are adjectives signifying 
qualities that are splitable. The adjectives ‘big,’ ‘forged,’ and ‘bad’ as 
in “That is a big flea,” “That is a forged check,” and “That is a bad 
man” are attributive adjectives because we cannot split the predication 
and logically say: that x is a flea and that x is big, that y is a check and 
that y is forged and that z is a man and that z is bad.  
Predicative adjectives such as ‘red,’ ‘shiny’ and ‘stinky’ as in 
“That is a red apple,” “That shiny penny,” “Those are stinky feet” are 
predicative adjectives because they allow us to split the predication 
and logically say: that x is a book and that x is red, that y is a penny 
and that y is shiny and those zs are feet and those zs are stinky. Though 
they may not be existentially separable from substances, they are 
logically cognizable as such and can be conceptualized as such.  
According to Geach, the important features of attributive 
qualities are: (1) that they require something substantive to be attached 
to in order to exist, (2) that they are (usually) bound to that something 
as a modification of its function (3) that this close relationship between 
function and substance means that there is no single, simple 
unequivocal meaning of goodness or evil but (4) this does not mean 
that attributive adjectives are only subjective. For Geach, goodness and 
badness are not free floating or existentially prescindable qualities. 
Goodness and badness signify the state of some substance say, human 
such that it is inadmissible to say that whatever is true about being a 
human is also true about being a bad human or about being a good 
human, or that the word ‘good’ in the sentence “Ann is a good 
human,” the word ‘good’ in the sentence “Cooper is a good dog” or the 
word ‘good’ in the sentence “That horse has passed good urine,” do 
not share a univocal meaning, nor do they refer to a prescindable, 
simple, singular quality which can exist separately from these 
substances. ‘Good’ designates a different set of functional attributes in 56      AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences                         
 
each case though the difference in the constellation of attributes in 
each case does not preclude the objective judgment that they are good 
in their own ways and that it is possible to know them as such.  
In persuasively arguing these points Geach contributed both to 
the rehabilitation of naturalist ethics by linking goodness and evil so 
directly to substance or nature and to rehabilitation of naturalist ethics, 
which in the last twenty years have again achieved respectability.  
 
POSITIVE META-ETHICAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT 
NATURALISM AND ANTI-NATURALISM  
Before proceeding to discuss some of the pitfalls of contemporary 
Darwinian naturalism in ethics, now would be a good time to 
summarize some of the conclusions it is possible to draw on the basis 
of the preceding discussions.  
First, there is no decisive general argument that is conclusive in 
demonstrating the impossibility of deriving an ought from an is. Some 
naturalists of the empiricist or metaphysical variety have proposed 
unconvincing ways of doing this, but more often than not, the 
difficulty lies not in the project, itself, but in faulty approaches to the 
idea of nature, the good, moral action, moral intention, and so on.  
Second, and especially germane to the first point, is the 
question of what constitutes the nature from which the ought is to be 
derived. One of the difficulties with naturalist ethics has to do with 
how one choose to define the idea of nature upon which one is to base 
one’s naturalism. Although naturalism is generally associated with a 
specific idea of natural possibility within the world’s physical horizon, 
it need not be. The word nature is charged with an ambiguity that 
suggests naturalism might be construed in a variety of other ways, as 
G.E. Moore has suggested. Aside from referring to the merely physical 
world, there is a more venerable meaning of ‘nature’ that makes its 
referents not the merely physical or material as if these were not ideas 
in process but whatever constitutes the power of anything that is. Here, 
naturalism takes the wider metaphysical scope of the powers, regular 
features and structures that make all beings what they are. It possesses 
a wider horizon that is broad enough to include what has been 
traditionally termed the supernatural. In this sense, the natural is closer 
to Geach’s (and St. Thomas’) understanding of substance. It is clear 
that any non-naturalist ethics will vary in scope according to the theory 
of naturalism that it sets itself against. A non-naturalist ethics, which 
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broader fashion than a non-naturalist ethics that takes a broad meaning 
of naturalism as its antithesis. The former will find the refutation of 
naturalism easier than the latter.  
Third, if we link Searle’s method for deriving the ought from 
the is with Geach’s understanding of attributive adjectives/qualities we 
have a way for explaining what natural good is. If we grant the 
existence of Searlean institutional facts as facts that are governed by 
constitutional rules without which they would be impossible, and, if 
we further grant that constitutional rules establish the very institution 
that they regulate because “constitutive rules constitute (and also 
regulate) forms of activity whose existence is logically dependent on 
the rules,” there is nothing to prevent us from expanding the scope of 
these rules to the natural world. (Searle 1964/1967, 112) If the natural 
order is viewed as possessing constitutive laws which determine 
whatever may be, and if we link these constitutive laws to the “edicts” 
of God as constituting a good order (and not necessarily a right order, 
then the religious morality founded in commandment and covenant are 
the constitutional rules governing the natural (that is institutional) 
order. Whatever is in harmony with the intended order as expressed in 
the constitutive rules whatever is commandment and covenant is 
ordered and good and whoever flouts or whatever deviates from these 
constitutive rules is disordered.  
Fourth, the resulting ethics/moral theology will be naturalist 
and theonomous and will accept complex characterizations of 
goodness and evil equivalent to the intended functional characteristics 
of substances. It will reject that mystification of the good construed in 
Moore’s ethics as anti-naturalist simple, single, irreducible and 
indefinable in favor of one that is naturalist, complex, multiple, 
functionalist and progressively expandable.  
Fifth, the resulting ethics/moral theology will view with 
appreciation those parts of Moore’s critique of social Darwinism and 
the various programs of Eugenics that depend upon it so long as this 
critique does not rely on the mystification of the Moorean conception 
of the good. Accepted are the following criticisms: (a) that social 
Darwinians are wrong to attach moral value to the strictly scientific 
category of the adaptation; (b) that this transvaluation introduces an 
inadmissible teleology understood as the organism’s adaptive 
perfection and a valorized direction to the evolutionary process, as a 
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notion of goodness to single properties, univocally defined 
adaptedness, pleasure, etc. these attempts are to be rejected.  
Sixth, it is not necessary to be an anti-naturalist to find social 
Darwinian approaches to ethics objectionable. It is possible to be a 
naturalist in the moral theological sense described above and to reject 
social Darwinism and/or to find that it is an illicit kind of naturalist 
ethics.  
 
THE GIRARDIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF 
SOCIAL DARWINIAN EUGENICS  
The Girardian theory of sacrifice appropriately ramified 
provides a needed supplement to naturalist ethics of the metaphysical 
aretological kind (Girard 2001, 1989, 1987). Inasmuch as the practice 
of Eugenics has had a public and private application, each application 
is susceptible to a different analysis springing from Girardian theory.  
The first feature of ethical systems—the way they characterize the 
nature of the good—has great relevance to the evaluation of sacrifice. 
Especially as it is fundamental to the kind of ethical system in which 
sacrifice finds itself, it establishes the definitive meaning of the nouns 
“the Good” or “goodness” and the adjective “good” as these are related 
to sacrificial action.  
The public practice of Eugenics has been generally linked to 
totalitarian regimes. Michel Foucault has described the totalitarian 
control of the gene pool as the hyper-development of what he terms 
biopower and what Robert Jay Lifton clearly paralleling Foucault’s 
analysis and terminology calls biocracy. (Foucault 1975-1976/2003, 
243, 243-245, 253-263) “Biopolitics deals with the population … as a 
political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, 
as a biological problem and as power’s problem.” (Foucault 1975-
1976/2003, 245) Foucault believes that, in the 19
th century, a sea 
change took place in the conceptualization of state power from the 
right of life and death the right to kill and let live to the right to make 
live and let die.
4 Prior to the 19
th century the active power of the state 
                                                           
4 Foucault, in the following passage, provides an illuminating explanation of why this 
sea change took place:  
One might say this: It is as though power, which used to have 
sovereignty as its modality or organizing schema, found itself 
unable to govern the economic and political body that was 
undergoing both a demographic explosion and industrialization.   
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could only be exercised negatively, the state did not possess the 
technical means to improve and sustain life. Beginning in the later part 
of the 18
th century epidemics are virtually mastered and the state 
begins to develop natalist policies, controlling fertility and infant 
morbidity. Because of superior organization, technology and control, 
the 19
th century state focused more and more attention on the endemics 
of populations “the form, nature, extension, duration and intensity of 
the illnesses prevalent in a population.” (Foucault 1975-1976/2003, 
243) The State began to claim expansive “control of the biological.” 
The final domain of control which the 19
th century state attempt to 
achieve is “control over the relations between the human race, or 
human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are a 
species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, [or] 
the milieu in which they live.” (Foucault 1975-1976/2003, 245) And 
the attempt to do so works at the level of greatest generality, to 
maintain a statistical average, a kind of regularity, homogeneity or 
homeostasis across the whole of society. (Foucault 1975-1976/2003, 
246)  
Once the state assumes total control of biopower, racism and its 
accompanying program of eugenics enter the picture because they 
allow for near absolute control of the population. (Foucault 1975-
1976/2003, 256) The first see this linkage were the 19
th century 
theoreticians of the planned state, the socialist thinkers. Even so, it 
emerged not among those socialist states in which the transition from a 
capitalist to socialist society was viewed as a technical problem in 
economics but where that transition was viewed as a life and death 
                                                                                                                                          
mechanism of the power of sovereignty, both at the top and the 
bottom, both at the level of detail and at the mass level. A first 
adjustment was made to take care of the details. Discipline has 
meant adjusting power [250] mechanisms to the individual body by 
using surveillance and training. That, of course, was the easier and 
more convenient thing to adjust. That is why it was the first thing 
to be introduced … in the restricted framework of institutions such 
as schools, hospitals, barracks, workshops and so on. And then at 
the end of the eighteenth century, you have a second adjustment; 
the mechanisms are adjusted to phenomena of population, to the 
biological or biosocial processes characteristic of human masses. 
This adjustment was much more difficult to make because it 
implied complex systems of coordination and centralization.  
See Michel Foucault. (2003 [1975-1976]). Society Must be Defended. 249-
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struggle between classes or nations. There, it becomes a necessity to 
justify the murder of the other. Racism fragments personal relations 
within and between states in order to distinguish the pure, strong, 
functional or superior from the corrupt, the weak, defective or inferior 
according to the naturalist logic of “To live, you ought to kill the 
other,” or “If you let others die, you will live more.” (Foucault 1975-
1976/2003, 255) To kill the inferior means that life, in general, will 
become “healthier and purer.” (Ibid.)  
Not scientifically Darwinian, racist ideologies employ the logic 
that the extirpation of inferior species or race, of the defective other, 
means the vigor and proliferation of one’s own species. (Ibid.) Racism 
coupled with biopower forces the option than that all biological 
competition be eliminated; it ultimately justifies state supported 
murder. To date, Nazi (National Socialist) Germany was the regime 
where biopower reached its most expansive control. “Controlling the 
random element inherent in biological processes was one of the 
regime’s immediate objectives” so that control over procreation, 
heredity, illness, accident were so tightly regulated that the power to 
kill was valorized and distributed through the whole society. (Foucault 
1975-1976/2003, 259) Not only the upper echelons of the state 
possessed this power, but it was granted to different ranks the SS and 
the SA, for example and even among the general masses as the power 
to inform against one’s neighbors, to have “them done away with.” 
(Ibid.) The destruction of other races was only one prong of the Nazi 
objective, the other prong being the universal exposure of the general 
population to the threat of death. (Ibid.) “Exposing the entire 
population to [biological control and the possibility of] universal death 
was the only way it could truly constitute itself as a superior race and 
bring about its definitive regeneration once the other races had been 
either exterminated or enslaved forever.” (Foucault 1975-1976/2003, 
260)  
At the end of this historical development is the 20
th and 21
st 
century statist appropriation and extension of biopower beyond all 
limits, so that it now becomes possible not only “to manage life, but to 
make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the monster, to 
build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally 
destructive” so that biopower will be “put … beyond all sovereignty.” 
(Foucault 1975-1976/2003, 254)  
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THE GIRARDIAN SUPPLEMENT TO THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL 
DARWINIAN EUGENICS  
The connection that the Giradian anthropology establishes between 
mimesis and sacrifice provides a central insight into the nature of 
aretology and hamartiology, one that is of great benefit for the 
clarification of the role that these disorderings play in the practice of 
Eugenics. It can help us to see an analogy between sacrificial 
scapegoating as it has appeared in religious practice and sacrificial 
scapegoating as it appears (and has appeared) in the various programs 
of eugenics that are part and parcel of a social Darwinian ethical 
naturalism of both the statist and individualist variety.  
Totalitarian regimes are regimes of terror in which the control 
of composite populations and of external threats is accomplished by 
means of violence. Totalitarian regimes use the promised homogeneity 
of a genetically or racially uniform population as a means for 
accomplishing two things: (a) the minimization of mimetic rivalry 
among members of the in-group and (b) the maximization of 
difference between the in-group and the external threat. Within such a 
system, controlled terror has the purpose of making all members equal 
under the possibility of being scapegoated, especially as this 
scapegoating is the constant background threat which hovers ready to 
fall on anyone whose heterogeneity marks them as inferior, impure, 
unfit, degenerate, and so on, a heterogeneity generally under the 
control of the in-group memeber. The biopower exercised in control of 
subsequent generations is simply a species of this wider violence used 
to threaten the general population and control the mimetic rivalry that 
might undermine that control. Members buy into the program of 
eugenics (a) because it offers an alternative to their own scapegoating, 
(b) because resistance to it would, itself, constitute a heterogeneity 
which would make them culpable for scapegoating, (c) because they 
recognize that it whether explicitly or implicity, that is, whether from 
commitment to the racist ideology of the state or out of fear of 
instigating a mimetic session is an instrument that reduces mimetic 
rivalry, because their children will be pure, fit, superior, etc., and, 
finally, (d) because doing so constitutes a species of positive mimesis 
according to the values of the totalitarian society. Here, the Girardian 
understanding of mimesis also opens up the hamartiological 
components of totalitarian biocracy. Although we don’t have time in 
this piece to explore this in detail, it would be possible to give a 
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mimetic and anti-mimetic moments in totalitarian biocrasy. The 
obvious ones are: cowardice, fear and imprudent conformity.  
If we further subject totalitarian eugenics to the five-part 
analysis suggested at the beginning of this paper, we see that the notion 
of the Good driving it is one which equates the supreme good with the 
state’s will that it survive in the struggle with the other. In the case of 
the Nazi’s, the supreme good was touted as alternatively as the 
Furher’s will, or the state religion of the will equivalent to “’an all-
encompassing metaphysical principle’” amounting to total control over 
life and death. (Lifton 1986, 16) Thus construed, the state religion of 
the will is viewed as an equivalent of the naturalist principle of 
adaptability. To preserve its genotype is the goal of the racist state. Its 
will do so is equivalent with the highest good and all actions are 
ordered to serve it. The eugenic exclusion of specific genetic traits, 
here, has a utilitarian moral purpose of selecting for what diminishes 
difference and, hence, intra-group rivalry. The particular act of 
selection whether active killing or active genetic pre-selection or 
biogenetic engineering is good both intrinsically and extrinsically; the 
act of selection is equivalent within the totalitarian system to the 
creation of perfection, a creation that will also have extrinsic benefits, 
consequences which are indeed figured into its value. The intention of 
the sacrificial act is productive of the development of virtues that 
typify the member of the totalitarian society, virtues such as obedience, 
doing the hard thing, while the value of the victim or germ line 
sacrificed is negated or weighed against the ultimate good, the fitness 
of the race. Clearly the totalitarian statist approach to the elimination 
of undesirable genetic stock whether by program of genocide, 
controlled breeding or bioengineering is driven by logic similar to that 
of the Girardian model of scapegoating (Girard 2001, 1989, 1987).  
In the last ten years, the potential to control the eugenic 
features of humans has increased dramatically with techniques such as 
somatic gene and germ-line therapy.
5  Although these developments 
                                                           
5 Germ line therapy is to be distinguished from somatic gene therapy in that the 
former is the genetic alteration of the cells that are found in the ovaries and testes, 
while the latter is the genetic alteration of the cells of other diseased bodily organs. 
Germ line therapy affects the genetic inheritance of subsequent generations (not yet 
born) whereas somatic gene therapy has the more immediate purpose of curing a 
specific, living individual, a cure (or alteration) that will not be transmitted to 
subsequent generations. Among the diseases that can possible be cured by somatic 
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will certainly influence the eugenic purposes of totalitarian biocracies 
to come, where they have received most play is in the context of the 
postmodern free-market societies, where the availability of such 
genetic technologies is likely to become widespread by the end of this 
century. In the midst of the play of free-market forces, a new more 
insidious naturalist fallacy has emerged to challenge ethicists it is, 
“Whatever is technologically possible is obligated.” Barely a day 
passes that some pundit suggests the improvement of the human race. 
Some months ago, I myself witnessed a most chilling interview with 
Lee Silver in which he spoke in glowing terms of parents, who by the 
end of this century will have the ability to bioengineer their children to 
be tall, blond, to have high I.Q.s, but also to meld human genetic 
material with the xeno-genetic material of other species, like cats and 
dogs, so that they will see without difficulty in the dark and be able to 
smell the fear on their business associates. All this he described, with 
supreme confidence, as a fait accompli. The advantage, he admitted 
would go to the rich with the inevitable result being a global 
civilization consisting of two classes separated by a wide gulf. At the 
empyrean heights will be the managers the superhumans and subject to 
their direction will be the rest of humankind, the managed, those too 
poor to have been adequately engineered.  
The moral dilemmas occasioned by eugenic bioengineering are 
not usually connected to the healing of diseases caused by mono-genic 
traits as is the case with somatic gene alteration. The elimination of 
most mono-genic defects is genuinely considered by most ethicists and 
moral theologians to be therapy. Rather, the real dilemmas of 
bioengineering are connected with three issues: (a) whether we ought 
to attempt to “improve” creation, (b) who or what authorizes such an 
improvement and (c) whether we ought to take the risk of improving 
creation over and against the possible unforeseen disasters possibly 
resulting from the alteration of polygenic traits.  
                                                                                                                                          
combined immune deficiency and Down’s and Turner’s syndromes. In contrast, germ 
line therapy is the alteration of subsequent genetic inheritance down a lineage in 
order to eliminate diseases among the heirs or in order to bio-engineer a superior 
generations. Neither form of bioengineering is a panacea. Only about 2% of human 
diseases are thus treatable by either method; 98% are a combination of environmental 
and polygenic factors impossible to disentangle. See: Michael J. Reiss and Roger 
Straughan (2001). Improving Nature? The Science and Ethics of Genetic Engineering, 
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The private practice of eugenics has been made a contemporary 
reality under the thralldom of freemarket capitalism. This means that 
the mimetic features of such practices are not state imposed but are 
controlled with relative autonomy by individuals. Although the 
instrumentality of totalitarian eugenic practices is preserved in free-
market eugenics the values governing selections are variable, though 
social Darwinian naturalism is the value system guiding some of its 
theoreticians and practitioners. Likewise, the mimetic relations 
involved in this form of eugenics follow a different logic which is 
much more variable. Here, since individual choice is freer the very 
forms of mimesis that drive consumption (and production) are likelier 
to be in play. The desire to have what the other desire’s means that the 
killing, active selection and bioengineering of heirs is likely to follow a 
competitive pattern. Here, the eugenic winnowing, because it is not 
coercive but accomplished by a relatively free actor, carries with it the 
illusion that it is not sacrificial scapegoating. There is no clear parallel 
between the violence directed against the other which is so ubiquitous 
in the totalitarian biocracy and the free-market selection of heirs. But 
the lack of a clear parallel is deceptive. The free-market practitioner of 
eugenics engages in a scapegoating practice which is tantamount to the 
cutting off of potential lives which apart from the question of the 
morality of abortion or infanticide is equivalent to actively deselecting 
germ-lines or more audaciously expressed potential alternative lives.  
Apart from the inability to calculate the consequences of such 
intentional intervention, the de-selection and selection of traits is 
hardly likely to be benign and disinterested. Most likely, it will follow 
a mimetic pattern governing the acquisition of commodities. Two 
forms of mimesis will be particularly in play, the desire to have what 
the other has and the desire to be what the other is will influence the 
selection of traits. The desire to have (or best) what the other has will 
be equivalent to the selection and engineering of traits in competition. 
The desire to be the other will mean that the parents will 
narcissistically select the traits of their child, making the child what the 
parents wish to have been, and this so that the parents can live 
vicariously through their progeny. In this sense, eugenic selection will 
serve the desires of the individual as inflamed by the competition to 
have what the other is or to be what the other is. In its very practice, it 
may increase the mimetic rivalry in society, while at the same time 
producing homogeneity. Even the radically narcissistic desire to 
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otherness—brings genetic novelty to a standstill. It is this height of the 
commodification of human personhood that calls attention to a 
question posed by Jürgen Habermas in his recent work, The Future of 
Human Nature. There, he asks whether a person who determined the 
essence of another person would not be guilty of destroying that 
equality of the genetic process which exists among persons of equal 
birth and provides for their difference. (Habermas 2003, 115) Might 
not a person feel limited and equivalent to a thing, if s/he came to 
understand that his/her constitution was designed for the purpose of 
fulfilling another’s desire?  
In contrast to the approach of totalitarian state, these 
disorderings are conducted by means of two distinctive intentionalities.  
Corresponding to the desire to have what the other has, individualistic 
eugenics results in the commodification of the human person while the 
desire to be what the other is results in narcissistic attempt to live 
vicariously through another person engineered (at least in part) for that 
purpose.  
If, finally, we attempt an analysis of free-market eugenics 
according to the five-part analysis of ethical features, we find that in 
free-market practice there is no specific axiology that universally 
governs the process of selection. Without taking account of mimesis, 
selection is relativized to the values of the individual. Practically, 
however, the mimesis which is part and parcel of capitalism would be 
a driving force in determining how selection is made, and that mimesis 
is tantamount to the scapegoating of the least powerful; it is the 
scapegoating of the generations yet unborn.  
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